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Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors

Author

Listed:
  • Ziv Hellman

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Miklós Pintér

    (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Abstract

We show that the equivalence of common priors and absence of agreeable bets of the famous no betting theorem can be generalised to any infinite space (not only compact spaces) if we expand the set of priors to include probability charges as priors. Going beyond the strict prior/no common prior dichotomy, we further uncover a fine-grained decomposition of the class of type spaces into a continuum of subclasses in each of which an epistemic condition approximating common priors is equivalent to a behavioural condition limiting acceptable bets.

Suggested Citation

  • Ziv Hellman & Miklós Pintér, 2022. "Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 567-587, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:51:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-022-00805-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00805-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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