Dynamic costly state verification
AbstractI study a model of dynamic risk sharing with costly state verification (CSV). In the model, a risk neutral agent enters an infinitely repeated relationship with a risk averse agent. In each period, the risk averse agent receives a random income which is observed only by himself, unless the risk neutral agent engages in costly monitoring. I provide a set of characterizations for the optimal contract, and I show that CSV has interesting effects on the long run distribution of the agents’ expected utilities. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (06)
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