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Who suffers and how much from corruption? Evidence from firm-level data

Author

Listed:
  • Andrzej Cieślik

    (University of Warsaw)

  • Łukasz Goczek

    (University of Warsaw)

Abstract

In this article, we study firm-level determinants of corruption using a sample of 164,000 companies from 144 countries for the 2005–2020 period. We analyze two variables related to corruption: the perception of corruption as an obstacle to doing business using an ordinal logit model and actual bribe tax payments using a fractional logit model. Controlling for other factors, both sets of our empirical results show that the extent of corruption is related to the time spent dealing with regulations and inspections. We argue that firms which spend more time dealing with administrative procedures have a greater perception of corruption and are forced to make significantly higher bribe payments. Therefore, in a successful fight against corruption, it is essential to simplify administrative procedures by reducing their number and eliminating direct contacts between firms and officials.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrzej Cieślik & Łukasz Goczek, 2022. "Who suffers and how much from corruption? Evidence from firm-level data," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 12(3), pages 451-473, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurasi:v:12:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s40821-021-00185-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s40821-021-00185-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Firm-level data; Developing countries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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