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Monotonicity and qualified majority rules

Author

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  • Uuganbaatar Ninjbat

    (The National University of Mongolia)

Abstract

This paper reflects on some results characterizing qualified majority rules using monotonicity as a key axiom. In particular, some errors in the existing literature are detected and ways to fix them are proposed. Then, the role of monotonicity axiom in characterizing majority rules is analyzed. There, among other findings, we show that its marginal contribution in characterizing relative qualified majority rules is the difference between two properties called sum-invariance and sum-monotonicity. Finally, a new class of qualified majority rules where voters exercise a veto power is introduced and axiomatically characterized.

Suggested Citation

  • Uuganbaatar Ninjbat, 2019. "Monotonicity and qualified majority rules," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 209-220, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:7:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-018-0154-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0154-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
    2. Perry, Jonathan & Powers, Robert C., 2010. "Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 57-60, July.
    3. Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
    4. M. Sanver, 2009. "Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 159-171, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monotonicity; Qualified majority rule; Anonymity; Majority rule with vetoes; Qualified Pareto rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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