The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements
AbstractThis paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. At the initial date, numerical simulations reveal that as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the incentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Dynamic Games and Applications.
Volume (Year): 2 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235
Other versions of this item:
- Nkuiya, Bruno, 2012. "The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 132419, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
- Bruno Nkuiya, 2012. "The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of State International Environmental Agreements," Cahiers de recherche CREATE 2012-7, CREATE.
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
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- repec:wsi:wsbook:7577 is not listed on IDEAS
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