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Game-Theoretical Model of the Voluntary Use of Insect Repellents to Prevent Zika Fever

Author

Listed:
  • Jabili Angina

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Anish Bachhu

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Eesha Talati

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Rishi Talati

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Jan Rychtář

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Dewey Taylor

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Abstract

Zika fever is an emerging mosquito-borne disease. While it often causes no or only mild symptoms that are similar to dengue fever, Zika virus can spread from a pregnant woman to her baby and cause severe birth defects. There is no specific treatment or vaccine, but the disease can be mitigated by using several control strategies, generally focusing on the reduction in mosquitoes or mosquito bites. In this paper, we model Zika virus transmission and incorporate a game-theoretical approach to study a repeated population game of DEET usage to prevent insect bites. We show that the optimal use effectively leads to disease elimination. This result is robust and not significantly dependent on the cost of the insect repellents.

Suggested Citation

  • Jabili Angina & Anish Bachhu & Eesha Talati & Rishi Talati & Jan Rychtář & Dewey Taylor, 2022. "Game-Theoretical Model of the Voluntary Use of Insect Repellents to Prevent Zika Fever," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 133-146, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:12:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s13235-021-00418-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00418-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Quintana-Domeque, Climent & Carvalho, José Raimundo & de Oliveira, Victor Hugo, 2018. "Zika virus incidence, preventive and reproductive behaviors: Correlates from new survey data," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 14-23.
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    4. Kristen Scheckelhoff & Ayesha Ejaz & Igor V. Erovenko & Jan Rychtář & Dewey Taylor, 2021. "Optimal Voluntary Vaccination of Adults and Adolescents Can Help Eradicate Hepatitis B in China," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-13, October.
    5. Cheol Yong Han & Habeeb Issa & Jan Rychtář & Dewey Taylor & Nancy Umana, 2020. "A voluntary use of insecticide treated nets can stop the vector transmission of Chagas disease," PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(11), pages 1-19, November.
    6. Turelli, Michael & Barton, Nicholas H., 2017. "Deploying dengue-suppressing Wolbachia : Robust models predict slow but effective spatial spread in Aedes aegypti," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 45-60.
    7. Li, Yazhi & Liu, Xianning, 2020. "Modeling and control of mosquito-borne diseases with Wolbachia and insecticides," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 82-91.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jovic Aaron S. Caasi & Brian M. Joseph & Heera J. Kodiyamplakkal & Jaelene Renae U. Manibusan & Leslie J. Camacho Aquino & Hyunju Oh & Jan Rychtář & Dewey Taylor, 2022. "A Game-Theoretic Model of Voluntary Yellow Fever Vaccination to Prevent Urban Outbreaks," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-14, August.

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