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Public Education via Exclusive Territories

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  • Edwin G. West

    (Carleton University)

Abstract

It is argued in the literature that, under completely free choice and market competition, the public benefits from education would be underproduced because, although each family will benefit from the social indoctrination of other people's children, it will concentrate on securing primarily private benefits from the schooling of its own. Similarly, it has been contended that, to resolve this free rider problem, education should be supplied on a noncompetitive basis via exclusive territories (zones). This article shows that the full logic of this type of welfare argument calls not for an exclusive public system but for some public and some private schooling for each and every child. Because this supply pattern is not found in the real world, the remaining alternative explanation for the continued supply of public schooling via exclusive territories is the simple presence of rent seekers on the supply side who enjoy monopoly conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Edwin G. West, 1990. "Public Education via Exclusive Territories," Public Finance Review, , vol. 18(4), pages 371-394, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:18:y:1990:i:4:p:371-394
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219001800401
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ronald H. Coase, 2022. "The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 19(1), pages 166–175-1, March.
    2. John Lott, 1987. "The institutional arrangement of public education: The puzzle of exclusive territories," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 89-96, January.
    3. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    4. Hettich, Walter, 1969. "Mixed Public and Private Financing of Education: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 210-212, March.
    5. Jack High, 1985. "State Education: Have Economists Made a Case?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(1), pages 305-323, Spring/Su.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marlow, Michael L., 1999. "Spending, school structure, and public education quality. Evidence from California," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 89-106, February.
    2. M.A. Marais, 1993. "The Theoretical Case for a Voucher Scheme in South Africa," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 93-01, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.

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