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Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union

Author

Listed:
  • C. Randall HENNING

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

  • Martin KESSLER

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

This essay on US fiscal federalism builds on the established tradition. But unlike many papers that take current US features as a given, the authors tell us what present arrangements governing responsibility over public debt gradually emerged from, and why. By bringing in the historical dimension and the trial-and-error process that took place over more than two centuries, they help us understand the logic behind alternative arrangements and why the current one has in the end prevailed.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Randall HENNING & Martin KESSLER, 2012. "Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1254
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal federalism; USA; public debt; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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