Fairness That Money Can Buy. Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice
AbstractContrary to communitarian market criticism institutions relying on money and bidding can strengthen faculties of ‘self-governance’. Securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations guarantees that all realized changes of a status quo are in an ‘objective’ (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. We show how to use this idea in the context of Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects. Empirical evidence on ‘procedurally fair bidding’ is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration but money may be the best means to express moral values in ‘communitarian consent’.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management in its journal Rationality, Markets and Morals.
Volume (Year): 4 (2013)
Issue (Month): 65 (May)
Fair Procedures; Governing the Commons; Communitarianism; Contractarianism; Egalitarian Mechanisms; Unanimity; ‘Crowding out’;
Other versions of this item:
- Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2013. "Fairness That Money Can Buy - Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-003, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2012. "Public projects benefiting some and harming others: three experimental studies," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Satz, Debra, 2010. "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195311594, Octomber.
- Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. " The Calculus of Consent after Thirty Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 341-53, June.
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