Procedurally Fair Provision of Public Projects An axiomatic characterization
AbstractUnanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a "productive state". At heart of such procedures is the determination of payments for all possible bid vectors such that equal "profits" according to bids emerge. Along with other intuitive requirements this characterizes procedurally fair bidding rules for advantageous projects of a collectivity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2011-016.
Date of creation: 22 Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Unanimity in Collective Decision Making; Buchanan; Wicksell;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-04-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-04-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2011-04-02 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2011-04-02 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. " The Calculus of Consent after Thirty Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 341-53, June.
- Werner Güth, 2011. "Collectively Ranking Candidates - An Axiomatic Approach -," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2012. "Public projects benefiting some and harming others: three experimental studies," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Simona Cicognani & Aanna D'Ambrosio & Werner Güth & Simone Pfuderer & Matteo Ploner, 2012. "Community Projects: An Experimental Analysis of a Fair Implementation Process," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-015, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Natalia Montinari, 2012. "Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: a theoretical and experimental analysis," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-005, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati, 2011. ""One man's meat is another man's poison." An experimental study of voluntarily providing public projects that raise mixed feelings," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
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