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Infrastructures publiques et politiques de développement décentralisées

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  • Figuières, Charles

    (Department of Economics)

  • Gardères, Philippe

    (Greqam)

  • Rychen, Frédéric

    (Greqam)

Abstract

This article provides a theoretical contribution on the issue of under-investment of public capitals. In a differential game of accumulation of capital between two jurisdictions, the open loop Nash equilibrium and the centralized solution converge towards their respective steady states. In the long run we characterize the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium using as a benchmark case the utilitarian centralized outcome. When the stocks of infrastructures are strategic complements, the jurisdictions under-invest (over-invest) in situations with negative (positive) externalities. When the stocks are strategic substitutes the same results hold for similar jurisdictions. On the contrary when the cost structures of the jurisdictions are different enough, it is shown within an example that the low-cost jurisdiction under-invests whereas the high-cost jurisdiction over-invests. We then broach briefly the economic policy implications of these results. Cet article apporte une contribution théorique au débat sur le sous-investissement en capitaux publics. Il utilise pour cela un jeu différentiel d’accumulation de capitaux entre deux collectivités. Dans ce jeu l’équilibre de Nash en boucle ouverte et la solution centralisée du jeu convergent à long terme vers un régime stationnaire. Dans le long terme nous étudions la nature de l’inefficacité de l’équilibre de Nash en prenant comme référence la solution centralisée utilitariste. Lorsque les stocks d’infrastructures sont des compléments stratégiques, les collectivités surinvestissent (sous-investissent) en présence d’externalités négatives (positives). Lorsque les stocks d’infrastructures sont des substituts stratégiques, les mêmes résultats restent vrais si les collectivités sont similaires. En revanche, nous montrons dans un exemple que lorsque les collectivités ont des structures de coûts assez différentes, la collectivité qui a le coût le plus faible sous-investit tandis que la collectivité qui a le coût le plus fort surinvestit. Nous discutons ensuite brièvement les implications de ces résultats en termes de politiques économiques.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 78 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (Décembre)
Pages: 539-570

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:78:y:2002:i:4:p:539-570

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  1. Alicia H. Munnell, 1990. "How does public infrastructure affect regional economic performance?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 34, pages 69-112.
  2. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  3. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas & Schwartz, Amy Ellen, 1995. "Infrastructure in a structural model of economic growth," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 131-151, April.
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  5. Shah, Anwar, 1992. "Dynamics of Public Infrastructure, Industrial Productivity and Profitability," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(1), pages 28-36, February.
  6. David Alan Aschauer, 2000. "Do states optimize? Public capital and economic growth," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 343-363.
  7. Figuieres, C., 1998. "Complementarity, Substituability and Capital Accumulation," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a31, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  8. Figuieres, C. & Garderes, P. & Michel, P. & Rychen, F., 1995. "The Dynamics of the Strategic Capital Accumulation," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 97a28, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  9. Berndt, Ernst & Hansson, Bengt, 1992. "Measuring the Contribution of Capital in Sweden," Working Paper Series 365, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  10. Wildasin, David E., 1991. "Some rudimetary 'duopolity' theory," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 393-421, November.
  11. WILDASIN, David, . "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -804, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Amy Ellen Schwartz, 1995. "Spatial Productivity Spillovers from Public Infrastructure: Evidence from State Highways," NBER Working Papers 5004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. John A. Tatom, 1991. "Should government spending on capital goods be raised?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 3-15.
  14. Gramlich, Edward M, 1994. "Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 1176-96, September.
  15. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 1994. "Public investment in infrastructure in a simple growth model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 1173-1187, November.
  16. Alicia H. Munnell, 1992. "Policy Watch: Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 189-198, Fall.
  17. Aschauer, David Alan, 1989. "Is public expenditure productive?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 177-200, March.
  18. Leon Taylor, 1991. "Building Infrastructure to Accomodate Growth," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 473-481, Oct-Dec.
  19. Fershtman, Chaim & Muller, Eitan, 1984. "Capital accumulation games of infinite duration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 322-339, August.
  20. Figuieres, C., 2000. "Dynamic Concepts of Interactions in Long Run Investment Games," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 00a01, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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  23. Taylor, Leon, 1992. "Infrastructural competition among jurisdictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 241-259, November.
  24. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 1997. "Productive government expenditures and long-run growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 183-204, January.
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Cited by:
  1. C. Dembour, 2008. "Competition for Business Location: A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 89-111, June.
  2. Charles Figuières, 2009. "Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 39-68, January.
  3. Denis Claude & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2012. "Regulation of Investments in Infrastructure: The Interplay between Strategic Behaviors and Initial Endowments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(1), pages 35-66, 02.

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