Infrastructures publiques et politiques de developpement decentralisees
We consider a capital accumulation game between two different jurisdictions. When the jurisdictions adopt open loop strategies, we study the inefficiency of the steady state Nash equilibrium with respect to the steady state utilitarian solution.
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