Complementarity, Substituability and Capital Accumulation
AbstractThe preemptive role of capital is analysed in a class of two-player symmetric capital accumulation differential games with reversible investment. It is proved that, in the medium run, the firm with better initial condition exploits its advantage when the game features feedback substituability. Indeed the feedback as well as the open loop Nash equilibria yield an overshooting with respect to the long run steady state for the capital stock of the advantaged firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 98a31.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.
Web page: http://www.greqam.fr/
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GAMES ; NASH EQUILIBRIUM ; CAPITAL;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
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- Figuières, Charles & Gardères, Philippe & Rychen, Frédéric, 2002.
"Infrastructures publiques et politiques de développement décentralisées,"
Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(4), pages 539-570, DÃ©cembre.
- Figuieres, C & Garderes, P & Rychen, F, 1997. "Infrastructures publiques et politiques de developpement decentralisees," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 97a16, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Denis Claude & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2012. "Regulation of Investments in Infrastructure: The Interplay between Strategic Behaviors and Initial Endowments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(1), pages 35-66, 02.
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