We consider a capital accumulation game between two different jurisdictions. When the jurisdictions adopt open loop strategies, we study the inefficiency of the steady state Nash equilibrium with respect to the steady state utilitarian solution.
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Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number
97a16.
Length: 25 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97a16
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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