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Structure de propriété, relation d'agence et performance financière

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  • Gérard Charreaux

Abstract

[fre] Structures de propriété, relation d'agence et performance financière. Ownership structures, agency relationship and financial performance. . Cette étude a pour objectif de tester l'incidence de la structure de propriété et plus généralement de la forme organisationnelle sur la performance financière, dans l'optique de la théorie de l'agence en distinguant trois types de sociétés : les sociétés manager/aies, les sociétés contrôlées et les sociétés familiales. Après une discussion préalable sur la notion de performance financière et le choix d'une mesure adéquate, les tests ont été conduits sur les différentes mesures sélectionnées et sur un échantillon de sociétés cotées françaises afin de vérifier la validité de certaines conclusions fondées sur des recherches effectuées aux États-Unis, puis d'apprécier la pertinence de la démarche proposée. Les conclusions obtenues corroborent la thèse de la neutralité de la structure de propriété, et plus généralement de la forme organisationnelle, lorsqu'on considère le point de vue des actionnaires. En revanche, si on adopte l'objectif de maximisation de la valeur de la firme, les sociétés familiales réalisent une performance supérieure. L'origine de ce dernier résultat qui confirmerait l'hypothèse de convergence des intérêts, pourrait se situer dans l'importance des coûts d'agence liés à l'endettement dans ce type de firme. [eng] Ownersfflp structures, agency relatlonship and financial performance . . This study aims to test the effect of ownership structure and more broadly of organizational form on financial performance according to agency theory, by distinguishing between three types of firms : managerial firms, controlled firms and family-owned firms. After discussing the financial performance notion and choice of a relevant performance measure, tests have been conducted on the selected measures for a sample of french listed firms in order to verify validity of some conclusions based on american studies and to judge the relevancy of the proposed arguing. Our findings corroborate the neutrality thesis of ownership structure and of organizational form, from shareholder's point of view. On the contrary, if we adopt the firm-value maximization goal, family-owned firms obtain a higher performance. This last resuit which should confirm the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, could be explained by importance of debt-financing agency costs in this kind of firms.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 42 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 521-552

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1991_num_42_3_409292

Note: DOI:10.2307/3502056
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco

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Cited by:
  1. Mondher Cherif, 1999. "Asymétrie d’information et financement des PME innovantes par le capital-risque," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 54(4), pages 163-178.
  2. Joon Tae Lee, 2004. "Structure de l’actionnariat familial et performance des grands groupes coréens," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(4), pages 143-166, December.
  3. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
  4. Mehdi Nekhili, 1999. "Le choix du type et de la maturité de la dette par les firmes françaises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 2(3), pages 179-206, September.
  5. Boyer, Tristan, 2002. "Gouvernement d'entreprise et décisions d'emploi
    [Corporate Governance and employment decisions]
    ," MPRA Paper 10287, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Laurence Godard, 1998. "Les déterminants du choix entre un conseil d'administration et un conseil de surveillance," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 1(4), pages 39-61, December.
  7. Réal Labelle & Alain Schatt, 2003. "Structure de propriété et communication financière des entreprises françaises," Post-Print halshs-00582792, HAL.
  8. Laurence Godard & Alain Schatt, 2004. "Les déterminants de la "qualité" des conseils d'administration français," Working Papers FARGO 1040603, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
  9. Ines Kahloul & Anouar Ben Mabrouk & Slah-Eddine Hallara, 2010. "Wavelet-Based Prediction for Governance, Diversification and Value Creation Variables," Papers 1011.5020, arXiv.org.
  10. Paul André & Eduardo Schiehll, 2004. "Systèmes de gouvernance, actionnaires dominants et performance future des entreprises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(2), pages 165-193, June.
  11. Charles Piot, 2005. "Les Comités De Rémunération Et De Sélection Sont-Ils Perçus Comme Des Mécanismes De Contrôle En France ?," Post-Print halshs-00581273, HAL.
  12. Hervé Alexandre & Mathieu Paquerot, 2000. "Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 3(2), pages 5-29, June.
  13. Gérard Charreaux, 2009. "La convergence des systèmes nationaux de gouvernance:une perspective contingente," Working Papers FARGO 1090701, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
  14. Gérard Charreaux & Philippe Desbrières, 1997. "Le point sur le gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers FARGO 0970701, Université de Bourgogne - Crego EA 7317/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
  15. Wiem Elmanaa Madani & Wafa Khlif, 2005. "Effets De La Structure De Propriete Sur La Performance Comptable : Etude Empirique Sur Les Entreprises Tunisiennes Indistruelles Non Cotees," Post-Print halshs-00581192, HAL.

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