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Le choix du type et de la maturité de la dette par les firmes françaises

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Author Info

  • Mehdi Nekhili

    ()
    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

Cet article met en évidence les avantages que présente l'intermédiation financière pour contrôler les dirigeants. Après avoir passé en revue les développements récents de la théorie de l'intermédiation financière, un modèle est appliqué à 84 firmes françaises afin de comprendre leur comportement en matière d'endettement. Les résultats montrent que la préférence pour la dette bancaire n'est pas absolue. Le choix du financement et de la maturité dépendent de la nature de l'actif à financer, de l'autofinancement, de la taille, de la structure de propriété et de la performance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 0990901.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.2, n°3, septembre 1999, p.179-206.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0990901

Note: article publié dans Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.2, n°3, septembre 1999, p.179-206.
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Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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Related research

Keywords: intermédiation financière; dette bancaire; dette obligataire; maturité de la dette; information asymétrique; risque moral.;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Dhikra Chebbi Nekhili, 2008. "Le choix de la forme organisationnelle en matière d’investissement en R&D à l’étranger par les firmes multinationales:la contribution de la théorie des coûts de transaction," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 11(3), pages 155-188, September.

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