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Les commissions de surendettement des ménages : de l’objectif de négociation à la prévention de la rechute

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  • Henri Fraisse
  • Anne Muller

Abstract

[spa] La ley Neiertz de 1990 instituyó comisiones de sobreendeudamiento para la ejecución de los procedimientos . colectivos de la reestructuración de la deuda de aquellas familias que presentasen dificultades de reembolso. Su objetivo inicial era el de conseguir un acuerdo negociado entre el hogar deudor y sus acreedores. Ante el aumento del número de familias afectadas, el legislador les confió posteriormente •implícitamente o no-la misión de reducir el número de solicitudes y de •segundas solicitudes”. Examinamos las resultados en los que podía desembocar una solicitud tratada entre 2007 y 2009 : inadmisibilidad, acuerdo negociado o soluciones judiciales. Seguidamente, buscamos los factores de recaída en el sobreendeudamiento de las familias orientadas en 2007. Los bajos ingresos, los gastos corrientes y las deudas elevadas dificultan la negociación. También entran en juego problemas de coordinación, puesto que un gran número de acreedores y una deuda dispersada reducen la posibilidad de obtener un acuerdo. Asimismo, las condiciones económicas locales, la rigidez de las comisiones y la identidad de los acreedores influyen en el resultado del procedimiento. No obstante, las comisiones consiguen obtener un acuerdo para aquellas familias sobreendeudadas en situaciones de empleo extremadamente precarias. . . En un periodo de dos años, una de cada cuatro familias a las que se les solicita el rembolso parcial de la deuda vuelve a caer. Su situación inicial •es decir, en el momento de la presentación de la solicitud-es el principal factor que explica la recaída. Las familias sobreendeudadas a las que se les concedió una moratoria habrían recaído hasta una de cada tres veces, y aquellas declaradas no admisibles, tras haberles recomendado planes de rembolso, un poco más de una de cada diez veces. De esta manera, las comisiones de sobreendeudamiento excluyen del procedimiento a aquellas solicitudes poco susceptibles de recaída. Por otro lado, aplican unos criterios más flexibles en cuanto a la aplicación de condonación o moratoria para aquellas familias en mayor situación de riesgo. [ger] Mit dem so genannten Neiertz-Gesetz von 1990 wurden Überschuldungsausschüsse eingerichtet, die für die gemeinsamen Verfahren zur Umstrukturierung der Schulden von Privathaushalten zuständig sind, die bei der Tilgung auf Schwierigkeiten stoßen. Ziel war es ursprünglich, im Wege von Verhandlungen eine Vereinbarung zwischen den Privathaushalten und ihren Gläubigern zu treffen. Aufgrund der Zunahme der betroffenen Haushalte hat ihnen der Gesetzgeber anschließend - implizit oder nicht •den Auftrag erteilt, die Zahl der eingereichten Anträge oder ihre Neueinreichung zu verringern. Wir bewerten die Determinanten des zwischen 2007 und 2009 verfolgten Ansatzes : Unzulässigkeit des Antrags, Vereinbarung im Wege von Verhandlungen oder gerichtliche Lösungen Danach prüfen wir die Faktoren der erneuten Überschuldung der Privathaushalte im Jahr 2007. Geringe Einkünfte, laufende Aufwendungen und hohe Schulden sind den Verhandlungen abträglich. Hinzu kommen Koordinierungsprobleme : Die Vielzahl der Gläubiger und eine große Streuung der Schulden verringern die Möglichkeit einer Einigung. Die lokalen wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse, das strenge Verhalten der Ausschüsse und die Identität der Gläubiger beeinflussen außerdem das Verfahren. Den Ausschüssen gelingt es aber, im Wege von Verhandlungen eine Vereinbarung für überschuldete Haushalte zu erzielen, die sich in den prekärsten Beschäftigungsverhältnissen befinden. Innerhalb von zwei Jahren wird im Schnitt jeder vierte überschuldete Privathaushalt, von dem eine teilweise Tilgung seiner Schulden verlangt wurde, rückfällig. Die anfängliche Situation, d. h. die Einreichung des Antrags, stellt den wichtigsten Faktor für die Rückfälligkeit dar. Die überschuldeten Haushalte, denen eine Stundung gewährt wurde, wären dreimal so viel rückfällig geworden, und diejenigen, deren Antrag für unzulässig erklärt wurde, etwas mehr als ein Zehntel, wenn man ihnen Tilgungspläne empfohlen hätte. So schließen die Überschuldungsausschüsse vom Verfahren Fälle aus, bei denen die Möglichkeit von Rückfällen gering gewesen wären. Dagegen behandeln sie Haushalte, die weniger Risiken in sich bergen, in Form von Streichung oder Stundung ihrer Schulden weniger streng. [eng] The 1990 Neiertz Act established overindebtendess commissions” in charge of collective proceedings for restructuring the debt of French households unable to meet their obligations. The initial goal was to negotiate amicable settlements between households and their creditors. To cope with the growing number of households concerned, lawmakers tasked the commissions -implicitly or not- with reducing the volume of initial and •repeat” applications for help. . We assess the determinants of the outcomes of applications reviewed between 2007 and 2009 : inadmissibility, amicable settlement, or court-ordered solutions. We then seek the factors responsible for relapses into overindebtedness among households assisted by the commissions in 2007. Low income, high current expenses, and heavy debt are detrimental to negotiation. Coordination issues also play a role : an abundance of creditors and high debt dispersion make a settlement less likely. The outcome is also influenced by local economic conditions, the strictness of the commissions, and the identity of creditors. However, the commissions do manage to arrive at negotiated solutions for overindebted households with the most precarious employment statuses. Over a two-year period, approximately one in four overindebted households that have been ordered to repay part of their debt relapse. The main explanatory factor is the household’s initial situation, i. e., at the time it files its case with the commission. According to our estimates, one in three overindebted households that have been granted a moratorium relapse into debt ; among households to whom the commissions recommended repayment plans, the proportion is slightly over one in ten. We conclude that the commissions reject applications from households that would have been unlikely to relapse. By contrast, they are more lenient towards households at greatest risk, by recommending debt forgiveness or a moratorium. [fre] La loi Neiertz de 1990 a instauré des commissions de surendettement en charge des procédures collectives de restructuration de la dette des ménages rencontrant des difficultés de remboursement. Leur objectif initial était d’arriver à un accord négocié entre le ménage et ses créanciers. Confronté à l’augmentation du nombre de ménages concernés, le législateur leur a ensuite confié implicitement ou non les missions de réduire le nombre de dossiers déposés, et de limiter les « redépôts ». Nous évaluons les déterminants de l’orientation suivie par un dossier considéré entre 2007 et 2009 : irrecevabilité, accord négocié ou solutions judiciaires. Nous cherchons ensuite les facteurs de rechute dans le surendettement des ménages orientés en 2007. Des revenus faibles, des charges courantes et des dettes élevées nuisent à la négociation. Des problèmes de coordination sont à l’oeuvre : un grand nombre de créanciers et une grande dispersion de la dette réduisent la possibilité d’un accord. Par ailleurs, les conditions économiques locales, la sévérité des commissions et l’identité des créanciers influencent l’issue de la procédure. Cependant, les commissions arrivent à une solution négociée pour des ménages surendettés aux situations en emploi les plus précaires. Sur deux ans, un ménage surendetté à qui a été demandé de rembourser une partie de sa dette rechute environ une fois sur quatre. Sa situation initiale c’est-à-dire lors du dépôt du dossier est le principal facteur explicatif de cette rechute. Les ménages surendettés bénéficiant d’un moratoire auraient rechuté à hauteur d’une fois sur trois et ceux déclarés irrecevables un peu plus d’une fois sur dix si on leur avait préconisé des plans de remboursements. Ainsi, les commissions de surendettement excluent de la procédure des dossiers qui auraient eu peu de chances de rechuter. En revanche, elles réservent un traitement moins sévère sous la forme d’effacement ou de moratoire aux ménages les plus en risque

Suggested Citation

  • Henri Fraisse & Anne Muller, 2011. "Les commissions de surendettement des ménages : de l’objectif de négociation à la prévention de la rechute," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 443(1), pages 3-27.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2011_num_443_1_9622
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2011.9622
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2011.9622
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    Cited by:

    1. Fraisse, H. & Frouté, P., 2012. "Households Debt Restructuring: Evidence from the French Experience," Working papers 404, Banque de France.
    2. Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais & Ydriss Ziane, 2012. "L’effacement des dettes des particuliers surendettés : Une étude empirique des décisions judiciaires," EconomiX Working Papers 2012-10, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    3. Nicoletta BERARDI & Guillaume GAULIER & Soledad ZIGNAGO & Fabienne MONTEIL & Dominique NIVAT, 2019. "Overindebtedness and women [Le surendettement et les femmes]," Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 224.

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