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L'utilisation des travaux de la nouvelle économie industrielle par les autorités de la concurrence

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  • Michel Glais

Abstract

[fre] L'analyse de la conformité des stratégies des firmes avec les règles du droit de la concurrence a longtemps été un domaine presqu'exclusivement couvert par les juristes. L'intérêt que lui portent les économistes depuis quelques années a tout d'abord permis un incontestable enrichissement de certaines décisions de justice : Appel aux enseignements de la théorie des jeux dans la détection des situations de collusion, de la théorie des marchés contestables dans les dossiers relevant de l'étude des projets de concentration, des positions dominantes, et des secteurs naturellement ouverts à la concurrence. . L'apport des économistes a également été d'une réelle importance lors de l'élaboration de nouveaux règlements adoptés en droit communautaire de la concurrence. Ainsi, le nouveau cadre juridique applicable aux accords verticaux et plus particulièrement les lignes directrices publiées par la Commission se réfèrent explicitement aux enseignements de la théorie de l'agence et de la théorie des économie de coûts de transaction. L'utilisation de certaines analyses relevant de la théorie de la production peut également être décelée dans l'appréciation des accords de R&D. [eng] For a long time, the analysis of the Compatibility of firm strategies with the rules of Competition Law was the Lawyers private domain. It can't be denied, however that the interest some economists have more lately shown in this field, has greatly helped to improve some juridical decisions. The Game Theory for instance has definitely been helpful in the detection of collusive situations, as indeed the Theory of Contestable Markets when dealing with merging projects.dominant positions, and industries newly opened to competition. Similarly the economists have largely contributed to the working out of the new competition law regulations. The latest legal framework concerning vertical agreements for instance, as well as the leading decision of the Commission make clear reference to the Agency and Transaction Costs theories. Besides, in its appraisal of R&D agreements, the Commission seems to make use of the production theory.

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  • Michel Glais, 2000. "L'utilisation des travaux de la nouvelle économie industrielle par les autorités de la concurrence," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(1), pages 197-223.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:caecpo:cep_0154-8344_2000_num_37_1_1295
    DOI: 10.3406/cep.2000.1295
    Note: DOI:10.3406/cep.2000.1295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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