Extent of the Integrated State Ownership and Effect of the State Control on Performance of Czech Firms
AbstractWe analyze the extent of the integrated state control over the privatized companies in the Czech Republic during the decade of 1995-2005. During this period, the integrated potential of the state to control companies had a pyramid-like form. Even though the pyramid control was not fully utilized, the state owned the golden shares that significantly improved state ability to control companies. Our findings suggest that state control in the period under research is correlated with decreasing, or even negative performance of companies. The efficiency of the state-owned companies was much lower than that of the privately owned. The inability of state agencies to cooperate and inefficient state administration are the most probable explanations behind our findings.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Politická ekonomie.
Volume (Year): 2011 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Postal: Redakce Politické ekonomie, Vysoká škola ekonomická, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
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