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Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

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  • Irena Grosfeld
  • Thierry Tressel

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on firm performance. Our results show that product market competition has a positive and significant impact on performance. Concerning the effect of ownership concentration, we find a U–shaped relationship with performance. Firms with relatively dispersed and relatively concentrated ownership have higher productivity growth than firms with an intermediate level of ownership concentration. This correlation between concentration of ownership and productivity growth is not explained by the type of the controlling shareholder. Finally, product market competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other rather than to be substitutes. Competition has no significant effect on performance for the firms with ‘poor’ governance; on the contrary, it has a significant positive effect in the case of firms with ‘good’ corporate governance. JEL classification: D24, G32, L1, P2.

Suggested Citation

  • Irena Grosfeld & Thierry Tressel, 2002. "Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 10(3), pages 525-551, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:etrans:v:10:y:2002:i:3:p:525-551
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0351.t01-1-00124
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ugur, Mehmet & Hashem, Nawar, 2012. "Market concentration, corporate governance and innovation: partial and combined effects in US-listed firms," Greenwich Papers in Political Economy 8840, University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre.
    2. Adriana Korczak & Piotr Korczak, 2009. "Corporate ownership and the information content of earnings in Poland," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(9), pages 703-717.
    3. Carlin Wendy & Schaffer Mark & Seabright Paul, 2004. "A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-45, September.
    4. Domanović Violeta & Jovanović Sandra Stojadinović, 2017. "Effects of Foreign Direct Investments on Serbian Exporters′ Profitability," Economic Themes, Sciendo, vol. 55(1), pages 1-23, March.
    5. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1quv2b21ai9o7p6v4ihttv00hu is not listed on IDEAS
    6. William Gonzalo Vega Salas & Ziliang Deng, 2017. "High ownership concentration and exporting of emerging market firms: evidence from Peru," Frontiers of Business Research in China, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, December.
    7. Ichiro IWASAKI & Satoshi MIZOBATA, 2018. "Post-Privatization Ownership And Firm Performance: A Large Meta-Analysis Of The Transition Literature," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(2), pages 263-322, June.
    8. Riaqa Mubeen & Dongping Han & Jaffar Abbas & Iftikhar Hussain, 2020. "The Effects of Market Competition, Capital Structure, and CEO Duality on Firm Performance: A Mediation Analysis by Incorporating the GMM Model Technique," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-18, April.
    9. Hashem, Nawar & Ugur, Mehmet, 2011. "Product-market competition, corporate governance and innovation: evidence on US-listed firms," MPRA Paper 37481, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2012.
    10. Nawar Hashem & Mehmet Ugur, 2013. "Corporate governance and innovation in US-listed firms: the mediating effects of market concentration," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur (ed.), Governance, Regulation and Innovation, chapter 4, pages 86-121, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Massa, Massimo & Rehman, Zahid & Vermaelen, Theo, 2007. "Mimicking repurchases," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 624-666, June.
    12. Byungjun Yu & Saixing Zeng & Hongquan Chen & Xiaohua Meng & Chiming Tam, 2021. "Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 1-20, January.
    13. Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda, 2011. "Rozsah integrovaného státního vlastnictví a vliv firemní kontroly na výkonnost českých podniků [Extent of the Integrated State Ownership and Effect of the State Control on Performance of Czech Firm," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(1), pages 82-104.
    14. Irena Grosfeld & Iraj Hashi, 2004. "The Emergence of Large Shareholders in Mass Privatized Firms: Evidence from Poland and the Czech Republic," Working Papers 2004.126, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    15. Saul Estrin & Jan Hanousek & Evzen Kocenda & Jan Svejnar, 2009. "The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 699-728, September.
    16. Irena Grosfeld & Iraj Hashi, 2003. "Mass Privatisation, Corporate Governance and Endogenous Ownership Structure," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-596, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    17. Evžen Kočenda & Jan Hanousek, 2012. "State ownership and control in the Czech Republic," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 157-191, August.
    18. Sprenger, Carsten, 2011. "The choice of ownership structure: Evidence from Russian mass privatization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 260-277, June.
    19. David Gempesaw, 2021. "Corporate governance and product market competition: evidence from import tariff reductions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1437-1473, May.
    20. Sergei Guriev & William Megginson, 2006. "Privatization: What We have Learned: World Bank's ABCDE 2006," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/1quv2b21ai9, Sciences Po.
    21. Ichiro Iwasaki & Satoshi Mizobata, 2020. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in European Emerging Economies: A Meta-Analysis," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 32-67, January.
    22. Baghdasaryan, Delia & la Cour, Lisbeth, 2013. "Competition, ownership and productivity. A panel analysis of Czech firms," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 86-100.
    23. Liu, Yong-Chin & Chen, Hsiang-Ju & Su, Ming-Chang, 2017. "Product market competition, type of mergers, and post-merger performance in Taiwan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 46(PB), pages 292-308.
    24. Charles W. Hodges & Bingxuan Lin & Chen-Miao Lin, 2014. "Product market competition, corporate governance, and cost of capital," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(13), pages 906-913, September.
    25. Claessens, Stijn & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2013. "Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 1-33.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies

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