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An Analysis of Expenses for the Outsourcing of Policy Advice on the Level of the Ministries of the Czech Republic

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  • Arnošt Veselý
  • František Ochrana
  • Stanislav Klazar

Abstract

The study is a contribution to the theoretical/empirical analysis of the problem of outsourcing of policy advice in the public administration. It provides the typologies of expenses for policy advice in the public administration and examines the relationship between internal and external expenses on an example of the ministries of the Czech Republic for the period from 2001 to 2011. It shows that extreme changes in the form of increases in expenses for outsourcing arise when an amendment to the Act on Public Contracts is prepared. We explain the problem on the basis of changes in the behaviour of the clients as a result of expected changes to the contracting conditions. The study shows that several factors influence the amount of expenses for the outsourcing of policy advice. The ""large"" ministries have relatively fewer expenses for the outsourcing of policy advice than ""small"" ministries. Ministries that have their own workplaces available in their structures (i.e. in the form of their own scientific research workplaces) have lower than average expenses for the outsourcing of policy advice. Ministries with higher average wages are ministries with a relatively large number of managers in relation to the number of analysts, and thus they implement a higher degree of external services (measured as a share of the wage expenses).

Suggested Citation

  • Arnošt Veselý & František Ochrana & Stanislav Klazar, 2015. "An Analysis of Expenses for the Outsourcing of Policy Advice on the Level of the Ministries of the Czech Republic," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(5), pages 581-601.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2015:y:2015:i:5:id:549:p:581-601
    DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.549
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    policy advice; outsourcing; internal expenses for policy advice; external expenses for policy advice; expenses for policy advice on the level of the ministries in the Czech Republic;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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