The Analysis of the Relationship Between the Rate of Competition and the Prices of Large Transport Infrastructure Buildings
AbstractThe paper is dealing with the problem of relationship between the rate of competition and final prices in the public procurement. This issue is analysed on the sector of infrastructure buildings in the Czech Republic. The main goal of the paper is to verify the relevance of the hypothesis, that there is a negative relationship between the number of bidders and the final prices. The paper is divided into five main parts. The main theoretical fundaments of the analyses are described in the first part, where the results of relevant sources are summarized as well. Next part highlights the system of financing the transport infrastructure in the Czech Republic and describes the main steps in the process of public procurement. Based on the theoretical analysis three hypotheses are formulated in the third part, which relevance is tested using the econometrics instruments. The results of the quantitative analyses are summarised in the fourth chapter. The last part, conclusion, summarises the main results and formulates the policy recommendations, which could increase the effectiveness of the public expenditure on the transport infrastructure.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Politická ekonomie.
Volume (Year): 2010 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Postal: Redakce Politické ekonomie, Vysoká škola ekonomická, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
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- AndréS GóMez-Lobo & Stefan Szymanski, 2001. "A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 105-113, February.
- Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
- Baron, David P, 1972. "Incentive Contracts and Competitive Bidding," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 384-94, June.
- Jan Pavel & Emilia Sičáková-Beblavá, 2013. "Do E-Auctions Realy Improve the Efficiency of Public Procurement? The Case of the Slovak Municipalities," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2013(1), pages 111-124.
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