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Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual market hypothesis

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Author Info
Germà Bel () (PPRE-IREA, Universitat de Barcelona (SPAIN).)
Xavier Fageda () (PPRE-IREA, Universitat de Barcelona (SPAIN).)

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Abstract

This paper empirically analyses the hypothesis of the existence of a dual market for contracts in local services. Large firms that operate on a national basis control the contracts for delivery in the most populated and/or urban municipalities, whereas small firms that operate at a local level have the contracts in the least populated and/or rural municipalities. The dual market implies the high concentration and dominance of major firms in large municipalities, and local monopolies in the smaller ones. This market structure is harmful to competition for the market as the effective number of competitors is low across all municipalities. Thus, it damages the likelihood of obtaining cost savings from privatization.

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Paper provided by Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP) in its series Working Papers with number XREAP2008-4.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision: Apr 2008
Handle: RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2008-04

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Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ci�ncies Econ�miques i Empresarials, Universitat de Barcelona, c/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11, 08034 Barcelona
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Related research
Keywords: Competition Concentration Local Services Privatization.

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Ferris, James M & Graddy, Elizabeth, 1994. "Organizational Choices for Public Service Supply," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 126-41, April.
  2. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
    Other versions:
  3. Dubin, Jeffrey A & Navarro, Peter, 1988. "How Markets for Impure Public Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 217-41, Fall.
  4. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2007. "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," NBER Working Papers 13350, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. AndréS GóMez-Lobo & Stefan Szymanski, 2001. "A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 105-113, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Stefan Szymanski, 1993. "Cheap rubbish? Competitive tendering and contracting out in refuse collection, 1981-88," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 14(3), pages 109-30, August.
  7. Domberger, Simon & Jensen, Paul, 1997. "Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory, Evidence, Prospects," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(4), pages 67-78, Winter.
  8. Bivand, Roger & Szymanski, Stefan, 2000. "Modelling the spatial impact of the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 203-219, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Vickers, John & Yarrow, George, 1991. "Economic Perspectives on Privatization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 111-32, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. E. Dijkgraaf & R. H. J. M. Gradus, 2007. "Fair competition in the refuse collection market?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(10), pages 701-704. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Barbara Antonioli & Massimo Filippini, 2002. "Optimal Size in the Waste Collection Sector," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 239-252, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Stefan Szymanski, 1996. "The impact of compulsory competitive tendering on refuse collection services," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 1-19, August. [Downloadable!]
  13. E. Dijkgraaf & R. Gradus, 2003. "Cost Savings of Contracting Out Refuse Collection," Empirica, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 149-161, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Domberger, S & Meadowcroft, S & Thompson, D J, 1986. "Competitive tendering and efficiency: the case of refuse collection," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 7(4), pages 69-87, November.
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