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CONTRACTING FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM U.S. CITIES -super-*

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Author Info

  • JONATHAN LEVIN
  • STEVEN TADELIS

Abstract

Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. We develop a model of this 'make-or-buy' choice that highlights the trade-off between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant determinants of contracting decisions. Our analysis suggests an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in contracting for government services. Copyright 2010 The Authors. The Journal of Industrial Economics 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 58 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Pages: 507-541

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:58:y:2010:i:3:p:507-541

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

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Cited by:
  1. Andersson, Fredrik & Jordahl, Henrik, 2011. "Outsourcing Public Services: Ownership, Competition, Quality and Contracting," Working Papers 2011:20, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  2. Germà Bel & Xavier Fageda & Melania Mur, 2011. "Privatization, cooperation and costs of solid waste services in small towns," IREA Working Papers 201111, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jul 2011.
  3. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl, Henrik, 2011. "Political Preferences and Public Sector Outsourcing," Working Paper Series 877, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  4. Cabral, Sandro & Lazzarini, Sergio G. & Azevedo, Paulo F., 2011. "Private Entrepreneurs In Public Services: A Longitudinal Examination Of Outsourcing and Statization Of Prisons," Insper Working Papers wpe_242, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
  5. Mark Partridge & Tim Sass, 2011. "The productivity of elected and appointed officials: the case of school superintendents," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 133-149, October.

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