On the Cost-vs-Quality Tradeoff in Make-or-Buy Decisions
AbstractThe make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple two-task principal-agent model. There is a cost-saving/quality tradeoff in effort provision. The principal faces a dichotomous choice between weak ("make") and strong ("buy") cost-saving incentives for the agent; the dichotomy is due to an incomplete-contracting limitation necessitating that one party be residual claimant. Choosing "buy" rather than "make" leads to higher cost-saving effort and -- in a plausible "main case" -- to lower quality effort; this in spite of stronger direct quality-provision incentives in the former case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010:2.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 26 Mar 2010
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
make-or-buy decision; manipulation; outsourcing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
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