Moral hazard, vertical integration, and public monitoring in credence goods
AbstractMoral hazard is a problem in markets where the qualities or characteristics of products cannot be verified with certainty by consumers. Here we demonstrate that vertical integration is one possible way of dealing with such problems. When the saving of monitoring costs is the driving force behind vertical integration, public monitoring freely available to the market may prevent vertical integration. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics in its journal European Review of Agricultural Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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