Asset Markets and Equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points: An Experimental Study
AbstractWe report experimental results on the effects that auctioning the right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection and individual behavior. Auctioning off such a right among a larger population of players strikingly enhances public good provision. Once public good provision is obtained, the auction price at the preliminary stage increases to its upper limit, dissipating all players' gains associated with the provision of the public good. Individual deviations from the equilibrium strategy are neither able to force lower market prices nor to affect provision of the public good in subsequent periods. (JEL C72, C92, H41) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer & Bruno Broseta, 2001. "Asset Markets And Equilibrium Selection In Public Goods Games With Provision Points: An Experimental Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-29, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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