Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection
AbstractWe auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MDPI, Open Access Journal in its journal Games.
Volume (Year): 4 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.mdpi.com/
ultimatum bargaining; auction; forward induction; loss avoidance;
Other versions of this item:
- Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2013. "Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2013-01, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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