150 Years of Patent Office Practice
AbstractThis article examines the administrative practices of the patent offices in 60 countries over a 150-year period, a little explored arena where government bodies and private firms interact. Larger and wealthier countries where international trade is more important give patent applicants more options. In these nations, patent office administrators' flexibility is often restricted and the responsibility for determining patentability divided between the patent office and the courts. Civil law nations tend to rely solely on the courts to determine patent validity and restrict the discretion of patent office administrators. They also tend to offer patent applicants more options. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal American Law and Economics Review.
Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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