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Cartels – Between Theory, Leniency Policy And Fines

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Author Info

  • Berinde Mihai

    () (University of Oradea, Faculty of Economic Sciences)

Abstract

Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most harmful to the competitive environment. Cartel participation is sanctioned both by national and community legislation with large fines, which can reach up to 10% of the turnover of the companies involved. In order to facilitate the detection of cartels, which are, by definition, secret agreements, instructions promoting a leniency program were elaborated at European Commission level, encouraging the participants to provide information regarding the existence of a cartel. It is expected that the large fines applied in cartel cases will increase the attractiveness of the leniency program and, implicitly, to the detection of an even greater number of such practices.

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File URL: http://steconomice.uoradea.ro/anale/volume/2008/v1-international-business-and-european-integration/119.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics in its journal The Journal of the Faculty of Economics - Economic.

Volume (Year): 1 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 549-552

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Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2008:i:1:p:549-552

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Related research

Keywords: cartel; leniency; fine;

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  1. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Law and Economics 0303006, EconWPA.
  2. repec:aea:jeclit:v:44:y:2006:i:1:p:43-95 is not listed on IDEAS
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