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Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking

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  • Kovacic, William E.
  • Shapiro, Carl

Abstract

Passage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly. Among American statutes that regulate commerce, the Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act outlawed "every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade" and "monopolization" and treated violations as crimes. By these open-ended commands, Congress gave federal judges extraordinary power to draw lines between acceptable cooperation and illegal collusion, between vigorous competition and unlawful monopolization.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series with number qt5zb4g387.

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Date of creation: 02 Oct 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:compol:qt5zb4g387

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Keywords: antitrust; Sherman Act;

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References

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  1. Kovacic, William E, 1992. "The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 294-306, April.
  2. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414 Elsevier.
  3. Gaskins, Darius Jr., 1971. "Dynamic limit pricing: Optimal pricing under threat of entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 306-322, September.
  4. George J. Stigler, 1980. "The Economist as Preacher," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 11, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  5. Carl Shapiro, 1989. "The Theory of Business Strategy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 125-137, Spring.
  6. George J. Stigler, 1947. "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55, pages 432.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Adriana Breccia & Hector Salgado-Banda, 2006. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Environment," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 423, Society for Computational Economics.
  2. Berinde Mihai, 2008. "Cartels – Between Theory, Leniency Policy And Fines," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 549-552, May.
  3. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2003. "Industry Trade-Balance and Domestic Merger Policy: Some Empirical Evidence from the U.S," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-19, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  4. James Dalton & Louis Esposito, 2011. "Standard Oil and Predatory Pricing: Myth Paralleling Fact," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 245-266, May.
  5. Török, Ádám, 2011. "A dominanciaproblémák tényeinek értelmezése és a közgazdaság-tudományi módszertan
    [Interpretation of the facts of dominance problems and the methodology of economics]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 41-55.
  6. BOCCARD, Nicolas, 2009. "On efficiency, concentration and welfare," CORE Discussion Papers 2009040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Joseph A. Clougherty, 2004. "Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a Global Context," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  8. Szücs, Florian, 2012. "Investigating transatlantic merger policy convergence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 654-662.
  9. Goodwin, Neva, 2005. "The limitations of markets: Background essay," MPRA Paper 27940, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  11. Richard J. Grimbeek & Sunel Grimbeek & Steven F. Koch, 2011. "The Consistency of Merger Decisions in a Developing Country: The South African Competition Commission," Working Papers 201117, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
  12. Robert E. Litan & Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Policy During the Clinton Administration," Law and Economics 0303003, EconWPA.
  13. Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Three alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory," MPRA Paper 33808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Adriana Breccia & Hector Salgado-Banda, 2005. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Framework," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0504, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  15. Giocoli, Nicola, 2010. "Games judges don't play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust," MPRA Paper 33810, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Lee, Cassey, 2004. "Legal Traditions and Competition Policy," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30697, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
  17. Marc Deschamps, 2013. "Pourquoi des politiques de concurrence ?," GREDEG Working Papers 2013-23, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
  18. Javier Campos Méndez & Juan Luis Jiménez González, 2003. "Old and new ideas in Competition Policy," Documentos de trabajo conjunto ULL-ULPGC 2003-06, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de la ULPGC.
  19. Adriana Breccia & Héctor Salgado Banda, 2005. "Competing or Colluding in a Stochastic Environment," Working Papers 2005-04, Banco de México.
  20. Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November.

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