Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 15 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
Non-cooperative tacit collusion; complementary bidding; incumbency premium; antitrust policy;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
- Humphreys, Brad & Ruseski, Jane, 2009. "Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football," Working Papers 2009-24, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
- Gregory Werden, 2008. "Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 433-451, December.
- Berliant, Marcus, 2011. "Repeated Commuting," MPRA Paper 28979, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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