Public Disclosure and Brokerage Search
AbstractSubjecting corporations to a higher standard of financial disclosure affects the welfare of public investors in several ways. By examining the interaction between a large public investor and dealers, we show that disclosure affects the equilibrium transaction price in two ways: (1) Disclosure increases the precision of all market participants' signals regarding the value of the risky asset and increases the equilibrium price; (2) Disclosure reduces the adverse-selection risk counter-party traders associate with a large size trade and reduces the equilibrium price. The net, overall effect of trade disclosure depends on the interaction of these two effects. Further, we show that in order for a rational expectations equilibrium to exist, the quality of firm-specific information resulting from disclosure has to be modest relative the perceived need for non-information trading.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by New York State Economics Association (NYSEA) in its journal New York Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Keim, Donald B & Madhaven, Ananth, 1996. "The Upstairs Market for Large-Block Transactions: Analysis and Measurement of Price Effects," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 1-36.
- Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
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