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Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice: Temptation, Perfectionism, Self-deception

Author

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  • Zak, F.

    (Central Economics Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

In this paper we give a survey of recent work on game theory devoted to modeling decision making under bounded rationality. An agent's deviation from rational choice understood as maximization of gain can be caused by moral principles (religious beliefs, altruism, patriotism), emotions (envy, wrath, shame, regret, or guilt) or simply by an attempt to comply with several criteria not reducible to a single one. In the first part of the survey we consider the behavior of agents subject to temptation, perfectionists, and persons susceptible to self-deceit.

Suggested Citation

  • Zak, F., 2014. "Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice: Temptation, Perfectionism, Self-deception," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 12-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2014:i:21:p:12-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
    2. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001. "Temptation and Self-Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
    3. Igor Kopylov & Jawwad Noor, 2009. "Self-Deception and Choice," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000319, David K. Levine.
    4. Noor, Jawwad, 2007. "Commitment and self-control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 1-34, July.
    5. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June.
    6. Igor Kopylov, 2012. "Perfectionism and Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 1819-1843, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Zak, F., 2014. "Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice. II. Shame, Regret, Egoism and Altruism," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 12-40.
    2. Danilov, V., 2015. "Beyond Classical Rationality: Two-Stage Rationalization," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 12-35.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    binary relation; preferences; utility function; two-period choice model; set betweenness axiom; temptation; self-control; perfectionism; self-deceit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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