Codetermination, R&D, and Employment
AbstractWe examine whether the German system of codetermination affects output, industrial employment, and R&D when firm asymmetry relies on different governance structures due to codetermination. Under a decision-making process shaped by utilitarian management, an intermediate degree of codetermination enables the codetermined firm to produce more output, hire more labor, and undertake more R&D activities, but this is not ensured for any degree of codetermination. This contrasts with situations where codetermination goes forward through bargaining between shareholders and workers, where the codetermined firm is able to produce more output, hiring more labor, and undertaking more R&D investments.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 162 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
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- Addison, John T. & Schnabel, Claus, 2009.
"Worker directors: a German product that didn't export?,"
IWQW Discussion Paper Series
01/2009, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW).
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- John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel, 2009. "Worker Directors: A German Product that Didn’t Export?," GEMF Working Papers 2009-02, GEMF - Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra.
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