Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Model Uncertainty and Delegation: A Case for Friedman's "k"-Percent Money Growth Rule?

Contents:

Author Info

  • JUHA KILPONEN
  • KAI LEITEMO

Abstract

Model uncertainty affects the monetary policy delegation problem. If there is uncertainty with regards to the determination of the delegated objective variables, the central bank will want robustness against potential model misspecifications. We show that with plausible degree of model uncertainty, delegation of the Friedman rule of increasing the money stock by "k" percent to the central bank will outperform commitment to the social loss function (flexible inflation targeting). The reason is that the price paid for robustness under flexible inflation targeting outweighs the inefficiency of money growth targeting. Imperfect control of money growth does not change this conclusion. Copyright (c)2008 The Ohio State University.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00127.x
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 40 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (03)
Pages: 547-556

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:40:y:2008:i:2-3:p:547-556

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Andreas Beyer & Vitor Gaspar & Christina Gerberding & Otmar Issing, 2008. "Opting Out of the Great Inflation: German Monetary Policy After the Break Down of Bretton Woods," NBER Working Papers 14596, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Luca Sessa, 2012. "Economic (in)stability under monetary targeting," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 858, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  3. Gerke, Rafael & Hammermann, Felix & Lewis, Vivien, 2012. "Robust monetary policy in a model with financial distress," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 318-325.
  4. Tillmann, Peter, 2012. "Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 204-207.
  5. Beyer, Andreas & Gaspar, Vítor & Gerberding, Christina & Issing, Otmar, 2008. "Opting out of the great inflation: German monetary policy after the break down of Bretton Woods," CFS Working Paper Series 2009/01, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  6. José De Gregorio, 2008. "Price Stability and Financial Stability: Some Thoughts on the Current Global Financial Crisis," Economic Policy Papers Central Bank of Chile 28, Central Bank of Chile.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:40:y:2008:i:2-3:p:547-556. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.