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Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games

Author

Listed:
  • Jaeok Park

    (Yonsei University)

  • Doo Hyung Yun

    (Yonsei University)

Abstract

We introduce possibilistic beliefs into strategic games, describing a player’s belief about his opponents’ strategies as the set of their strategies he regards as possible. We formulate possibilistic strategic games where each player has preferences over his own strategies conditional on his possibilistic belief about his opponents’ strategies. We define several solution concepts for possibilistic strategic games such as (strict) equilibria, rationalizable sets, iterated elimination of never-best responses, and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and we study their properties and relationships. We develop a class of possibilistic strategic games called possibilistic supermodular games to relate supermodular games to possibilistic strategic games. Lastly, we discuss a direction of extending our possibilistic framework to games with incomplete information.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaeok Park & Doo Hyung Yun, 2023. "Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 205-228, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:95:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-022-09919-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-022-09919-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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