Downstream price-cap regulation and upstream market power
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-007-9038-8
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Weisman, Dennis L, 1993. "Superior Regulatory Regimes in Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 355-366, December.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994.
"Access pricing and competition,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
- J-J. Laffont & J. Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 95-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Lyon, Thomas P, 1996.
"A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 227-247, May.
- Lyon, T.P., 1993. "A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation," Papers 93-011, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 1998. "The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 115-121, March.
- repec:bla:jindec:v:46:y:1998:i:1:p:115-21 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1995.
"Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?,"
Working Papers
95-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1997. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Industrial Organization 9701003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David E.M. Sappington & David S. Sibley, 1992. "Strategic Nonlinear Pricing under Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
- Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
- Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, April.
- Cabral, Luis M B & Riordan, Michael H, 1989. "Incentives for Cost Reduction under Price Cap Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 93-102, June.
- Weisman, Dennis L, 1995. "Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-266, November.
- Liston, Catherine, 1993. "Price-Cap versus Rate-of-Return Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 25-48, March.
- Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992.
"Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
- Green, Richard & Newbery, David M G, 1991. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Weisman, Dennis L., 2001. "Access pricing and exclusionary behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-126, July.
- Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
- Clemenz, Gerhard, 1991.
"Optimal Price-Cap Regulation,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(4), pages 391-408, June.
- Gerhard CLEMENZ, 1999. "Optimal Price Cap Regulation," Vienna Economics Papers vie8904, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Economides, Nicholas, 1998. "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 271-284, May.
- Aleksandr Rudkevich & Max Duckworth & Richard Rosen, 1998. "Modeling Electricity Pricing in a Deregulated Generation Industry: The Potential for Oligopoly Pricing in a Poolco," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 19-48.
- Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 1991. "Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 571-581, Winter.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2011.
"Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 273-292, June.
- Höffler, Felix & Kranz, Sebastian, 2007. "Imperfect Legal Unbundling of Monopolistic Bottlenecks," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 16/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schober, Dominik, 2013. "Static vs. dynamic impacts of unbundling: Electricity markets in South America," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-033, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
- Joan Calzada & Francesc Trillas, 2005. "The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 85-125, June.
- Tina Kao & Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2014.
"Optimal access regulation with downstream competition,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 75-93, February.
- Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin & Tina Kao, 2012. "Optimal Access Regulation with Downstream Competition," Discussion Papers Series 473, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Kao, Tina & Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2012. "Optimal access regulation with downstream competition," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151201, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006.
"Regulation, Competition and Liberalization,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
- Mark Armstrong & David Sappington, 2005. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Industrial Organization 0505011, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Oct 2005.
- Riechmann, Christoph, 2000. "Strategic pricing of grid access under partial price-caps -- electricity distribution in England and Wales," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 187-207, April.
- Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
- Stephen P. King, 1997. "National Competition Policy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 73(222), pages 270-284, September.
- isamu matsukawa, 2005. "Congestion pricing of inputs in vertically related markets," Industrial Organization 0506012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bickenbach, Frank, 1999. "Regulierung und Wettbewerb im Bereich der Netzinfrastrukturen: Begründung, Regeln und Institutionen," Kiel Working Papers 910, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Kotakorpi, Kaisa, 2002. "Access Pricing and Competition in Telecommunications," Discussion Papers 283, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
- Vogelsang, Ingo, 2000. "Regulation of Access to the Telecommunications Network of New Zealand: A Review of the Literature," Working Paper Series 3931, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Seok Yang & Myeonghwan Cho, 2024. "Pricing Third-Party Access to Essential Facilities under Asymmetric Information," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 40, pages 315-348.
- Weisman, Dennis L., 2001. "Access pricing and exclusionary behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-126, July.
- Christoph Bier & Dieter Schmidtchen, "undated". "„Golden-Gans“-Effekt, Preisdiskriminierungsgefahr und die Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1137, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2009.
"Access Charge, Vertical Separation, and Lobbying,"
Discussion Papers
2009-11, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2011. "Access charges, vertical separation, and lobbying," ISER Discussion Paper 0810, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Weisman, Dennis L., 2002. "Is there 'Hope' for price cap regulation?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 349-370, September.
- Larry Blank & John Mayo, 2009. "Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(3), pages 233-255, November.
- Carlo Cambini & Piercarlo Ravazzi & Tommaso Valletti, 2000. "La tariffazione dell'accesso nelle telecomunicazioni: principi economici e interventi regolatori in alcuni paesi industrializzati," ICER Working Papers 10-2000, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Bier, Christoph & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2006. ""Golden-Gans"-Effekt, Preisdiskriminierungsgefahr und die Regulierung von Netznutzungsentgelten," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-01, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Price caps; Market power; Vertical integration; Profit sharing; Supply schedules; K23; L13; L41; L43; L51; L97;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:33:y:2008:i:2:p:179-200. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.