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Bridge, Focus, Attack, or Stimulate: Retail Category Management Strategies with a Store Brand

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Author Info
Rex Du
Eunkyu Lee
Richard Staelin
Abstract

We investigate a monopolist retailer's category management strategy where the main strategic decisions are how to horizontally position a store brand relative to the incumbent national brands and how to price the store and national brands for retail category profit maximization. We analyze a market composed of two consumer segments with differing tastes and heterogeneity with respect to willingness to pay and a product category consisting of two competing national brands and one store brand. We find that contrary to the existing literature, it is not always optimal for a retailer to position its store brand against the leading national brand; instead there are many situations where it is best to position the store brand close to the weaker national brand or to position it in the “middle” so it appeals to both national brands' target segments. In the process we identify four distinct category management strategies that a retailer can use with a store brand. In three of these the optimal store brand price is the brand's monopoly price, while in the remaining one strategy the price is lower. We also suggest an easy to implement means for a retailer to determine which strategy is best to use, depending on the particular competitive environment present before the introduction of the store brand and the relative quality of the store brand. We find that the store brand entry is most beneficial to the retailer when the national brands are moderately differentiated. Finally we show that introducing a store brand not only allows the retailer to garner a higher share of the channel profits through higher retail margins, but also often provides the retailer the benefit of increases in national brand unit sales as well as incremental sales from the store brand. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11129-005-2779-8
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Quantitative Marketing and Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 393-418
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Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:3:y:2005:i:4:p:393-418

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=111240

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Related research
Keywords: store brands; retailing; category management; positioning; channel strategy; game theory; strategic pricing;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Connor, John M & Peterson, Everett B, 1992. "Market-Structure Determinants of National Brand-Private Label Price Differences of Manufactured Food Products," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2), pages 157-71, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Narasimhan, Chakravarthi & Wilcox, Ronald T, 1998. "Private Labels and the Channel Relationship: A Cross-Category Analysis," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(4), pages 573-600, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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