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Governance under the shadow of the law: trading high value fine art

Author

Listed:
  • Anja Shortland

    (King’s College London)

  • Andrew Shortland

    (Cranfield University)

Abstract

The market for paintings by well-known artists is booming despite widespread concern about art crime and difficulties in establishing provenance. Public law enforcement is imperfect, and court cases often are deemed problematic. So how is the thriving art market governed in practice? We analyze the protocols used by the top auction houses to identify and resolve problems of illicit supply—fakes, forgeries and items with defective legal titles—through the lens of institutional analysis. We uncover a polycentric private governance system in which different actors govern distinct but overlapping issue areas, motivated by profit, prestige, or the search for truth. When the financial stakes rise, opportunistic behavior undermines the credibility of private governance. We argue that as litigious, super-rich investors entered the art market, the interaction between public law and the traditional private governance system restricted the supply of “blue chip” art, driving the escalation of prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Anja Shortland & Andrew Shortland, 2020. "Governance under the shadow of the law: trading high value fine art," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 157-174, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:184:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00719-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00719-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Anja Shortland & Sami Fortune Winton, 2023. "Shades of Gray: Product Differentiation in Antiquities Markets," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 38(Spring 20), pages 1-27.
    2. Alexander Cuntz & Matthias Sahli, 2024. "Intermediary liability and trade in follow-on innovation," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 48(1), pages 1-42, March.
    3. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2022. "Overconfidence in the art market: a bargaining pricing model with asymmetric disinformation," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 39(3), pages 961-988, October.
    4. Kim Oosterlinck & Anne-Sophie Radermecker, 2021. "Regulation or Reputation? Evidence from the Art Market," Working Papers CEB 21-006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Art market; Fraud; Theft; Private enforcement of rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature

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