Rituals: An economic interpretation
AbstractThis paper provides a rational choice analysis of rituals, defined as predictable and regular observances of acts or procedures, which have a symbolic element resulting in the inculcation or reinforcement of shared values and beliefs. The purpose is threefold. First, to make clear why rituals matter for economic and social outcomes. Second, to engage in interdisciplinary exchange by demonstrating how economics can be blended with insights from other social sciences. Third, to gain insight into why rituals exist and persist, as well as the process through which rituals change.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 78 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Capabilities; Development; Identity; Rituals;
Other versions of this item:
- Coyne, Christopher J. & Mathers, Rachel L., 2011. "Rituals: An economic interpretation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 74-84, April.
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Easterly, W & Levine, R, 1996.
"Africa's Growth Tragedy : Policies and Ethnic Divisions,"
Papers, Harvard - Institute for International Development
536, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
- Easterly, William & Levine, Ross, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-50, November.
- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
- Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June.
- Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-57, January.
- Peter T. Leeson, 2008. "Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 161-188, 01.
- Easterly, William, 2000.
"Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict ?,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2482, The World Bank.
- Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December.
- Douglass C. North, 2005.
"Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change
[Understanding the Process of Economic Change]," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
- Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1993.
"Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,"
Economic History, EconWPA
- Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
- Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 202-31, April.
- Leeson, Peter T., 2005. "Endogenizing fractionalization," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 75-98, June.
- Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2008. "Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 331-358, 04.
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
- Rai, Birendra & Sengupta, Kunal, 2013.
"Pre-marital confinement of women: A signaling and matching approach,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 48-63.
- Birendra Rai & Kunal Sengupta, 2012. "Pre-marital Confinement of Women: A Signaling and Matching Approach," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series, Monash University, Department of Economics 32-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.