This article explores the extent to which a decisionmaker's probabilities can be measured separately from his/her utilities by observing his/her acceptance of small monetary gambles. Only a partial separation is achieved: the acceptable gambles are partitioned into a set of "belief gambles," which reveals probabilities distorted by marginal utilities for money, and a set of "preference gambles," which reveals utilities reciprocally distorted by marginal utilities for money. However, the information in these gambles still enables us to solve the decisionmaker's problem: his/her utility-maximizing decision is the one that avoids arbitrage (i.e., incoherence or Dutch books). Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Volume (Year): 10 (1995) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 71-91 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)