Property Condition Disclosure Law: Why Did States Mandate ‘Seller Tell All’?
AbstractThirty-six US states have already enacted some form of seller's property condition disclosure law. At a time when there is a movement in this direction nationally, this paper attempts to ascertain the factors that lead states to adopt disclosure law. Motivation for the study stems from the fact that not all states have yet adopted the law, and states that have enacted the law have done so in different years. The analytical structure employs hazard models, using a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for a panel of 50 US States spanning 21 years, from 1984 to 2004. The proportional hazard analysis of law adoption reveals that greater number of disciplinary actions tends to favor passage of the law. Greater broker supervision, implying generally higher awareness among real estate agents, seems to have a negative impact on the likelihood of a state adopting a property condition disclosure law.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics.
Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102945
Property condition disclosure; Law adoption; Hazard analysis; Housing price index;
Other versions of this item:
- Anupam Nanda, 2006. "Property Condition Disclosure Law: Why Did States Mandate 'Seller Tell All'?," Working papers 2006-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anupam Nanda, 2005. "Property Condition Disclosure Law: Does 'Seller Tell All' Matter in Property Values?," Working papers 2005-47, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2006.
- Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-79, June.
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"Panel Data Models: Some Recent Developments,"
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- Peter Kennedy, 2003. "A Guide to Econometrics, 5th Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 5, volume 1, number 026261183x, December.
- Anupam Nanda & Stephen L. Ross, 2008.
"The Impact of Property Condition Disclosure Laws on Housing Prices: Evidence from an Event Study using Propensity Scores,"
2008-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Anupam Nanda & Stephen Ross, 2012. "The Impact of Property Condition Disclosure Laws on Housing Prices: Evidence from an Event Study Using Propensity Scores," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 88-109, June.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Michael P. Stone, 2010.
"The Determinants of State-Level Caps on Punitive Damages: Theory and Evidence,"
2010-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Michael P. Stone, 2013. "The Determinants Of State-Level Caps On Punitive Damages: Theory And Evidence," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(1), pages 110-125, 01.
- Anupam Nanda & Katherine A. Pancak, 2009. "Broker Duty to Clients: Why States Mandate Minimum Service Requirements," Alumni working papers 2009-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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