Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior
AbstractThe main purpose of this study is to investigate how organizational slack is created and how it affects a firm’s performance. To address these questions, we construct three equations: managerial incentive function, organizational slack formation function and performance function, and we apply 3SLS simultaneously to these functions by using the data sets of 2,791 Japanese firms from the years 2001 and 2006. From the empirical analysis of these Japanese firms, we obtain the following results: a firm’s performance declines as organizational slack increases; organizational slack is affected by annual change rate of revenues but not by managerial incentive; managerial incentive decreases as a firm’s performance improves while it increases as the structure of corporate governance is strengthened. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2014
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Management & Governance.
Volume (Year): 18 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Organizational slack; Performance; Managerial incentive; Corporate governance;
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