CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada
AbstractExecutive compensation of 755 Canadian firms is examined over the period 1991-95, and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies: CEO pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance. In addition, executives in utilities earn lower pay, and their compensation is less responsive to performance, than is true for their counterparts in other industries. Some novel findings are also documented. First, the sales elasticity of CEO compensation is greater in larger firms. Second, while CEO turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm's stock performance, the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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