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The Performance Implications of Ownership-driven Governance Reform

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  • Yoshikawa, Toru
  • Phan, Phillip H.

Abstract

This paper explores the performance impact of recent changes in foreign shareholdings and boardroom reforms in Japan. Empirical research on the impact of reform on the Japanese corporate governance system could provide useful lessons for their European counterparts who are themselves facing similar pressures to reform. We found that although participation of outside directors in strategic decision-making was associated with positive stock returns, the increase in the ratio of outside directors, the separation of the board members and executive officers, and the reduction of board size were not related to firm performance.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Management Journal.

Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 698-706

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eurman:v:21:y:2003:i:6:p:698-706

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Related research

Keywords: Corporate governance Stakeholder governance Agency theory Board of directors Ownership structure;

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Cited by:
  1. Yoshikawa, Toru & Rasheed, Abdul A. & Del Brio, Esther B., 2010. "The impact of firm strategy and foreign ownership on executive bonus compensation in Japanese firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(11), pages 1254-1260, November.
  2. Post Raj Pokharel, 2013. "Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decision: A Case of Nepal," NRB Economic Review, Nepal Rastra Bank, Research Department, vol. 25(2), pages 78-89, October.
  3. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Eri Nakamura, 2014. "Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 245-284, February.
  4. Jean McGuire & Sandra Dow, 2009. "Japanese keiretsu: Past, present, future," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 333-351, June.
  5. Toru Yoshikawa & Jean McGuire, 2008. "Change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 5-24, January.
  6. Sandra Dow & Jean McGuire & Toru Yoshikawa, 2011. "Disaggregating the group effect: Vertical and horizontal keiretsu in changing economic times," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 299-323, June.

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