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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.

Volume (Year): 18 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 157-171
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:18:y:2000:i:2:p:157-171

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Related research

Keywords: clearinghouses; mutualization of risk; self regulation; payments systems;

References listed on IDEAS
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1. Heidi Willmann Richards, 1995. "Daylight overdraft fees and the Federal Reserve's payment system risk policy," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Dec, pages 1065-1077.
2. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   • Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1996. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 126, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
   • Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, . "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 465, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
3. anonymous, 1990. "Lenders of the next-to-last resort: scrip issue in Georgia during the Great Depression," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Sep, pages 16-30.
4. Pirrong, S.C., 1997. "A Positive Theory of Financial Exchange Organization with Normative Implications for Financial Market Regulation," Washington University 97-06, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University.
5. James T. Moser, 1998. "Contracting innovations and the evolution of clearing and settlement methods at futures exchanges," Working Paper Series WP-98-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
6. Timberlake, Richard H, Jr, 1984. "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Friedman, Milton & Schwartz, Anna J., 1986. "Has government any role in money?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 37-62, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 1987. "Has Government Any Role in Money?," NBER Chapters, in: Money in Historical Perspective, pages 289-314 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
9. Arthur J. Rolnick & Bruce D. Smith & Warren E. Weber, 1998. "The Suffolk Bank and the Panic of 1837: how a private bank acted as a lender-of-last-resort," Working Papers 592, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
10. Summers, Lawrence H, 1991. " The Scientific Illusion in Empirical Macroeconomics," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 93(2), pages 129-48.
11. Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, 1996. "The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payments Systems: Learning From the Suffolk System," NBER Working Papers 5442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, 1996. "The efficiency of self-regulated payments systems: learning from the Suffolk System," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 766-803.
    • Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1996. "The Efficiency of Self-Regulated Payments Systems: Learning from the Suffolk System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 766-97, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Kroszner, Randall S. & Rajan, Raghuram G., 1997. "Organization structure and credibility: Evidence from commercial bank securities activities before the Glass-Steagall Act," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 475-516, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1995. "Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities Before the Glass-Steagall Act," NBER Working Papers 5256, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, . "Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial Bank Securities Activities Before the Glass-Steagall Act," CRSP working papers 325, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.

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