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Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives Clearing Houses and Recent Over-the Counter Innovations

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  • RANDALL S. KROSZNER
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    Paper provided by Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago in its series CRSP working papers with number 493.

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    Date of creation: Mar 1999
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    Handle: RePEc:wop:chispw:493

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    Cited by:
    1. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "The supply of and demand for financial regulation : public and private competition around the globe : commentary," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 137-149.
    2. Philip E. Strahan, 2013. "Too Big to Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 43-61, November.
    3. Jens Nystedt, 2004. "Derivative Market Competition," IMF Working Papers 04/61, International Monetary Fund.
    4. John P Jackson & Mark J Manning, 2007. "Comparing the pre-settlement risk implications of alternative clearing arrangements," Bank of England working papers 321, Bank of England.
    5. Meeus, Leonardo, 2011. "Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 1470-1475, March.
    6. Eugene N. White, 2007. "The Crash of 1882, Counterparty Risk, and the Bailout of the Paris Bourse," NBER Working Papers 12933, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Randall Kroszner, 2000. "Lessons from Financial Crises: The Role of Clearinghouses," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 157-171, December.
    8. Robert R. Bliss & Robert Steigerwald, 2006. "Derivatives clearing and settlement: a comparison of central counterparties and alternative structures," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q IV, pages 22-29.
    9. Catherine Karyotis, 2008. "Histoire de la compensation: de la monnaie aux titres," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 91(1), pages 77-95.

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