Competition among the elites, property rights protection and economic performance
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 104 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
Institutions; Competition; Property rights; Economic performance; Regulation; H20; O10; P16;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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