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The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights

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Author Info
de Meza, David
Gould, J R

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Abstract

Costs must be incurred if an owner is to enforce private property rights effectively. The authors show that, in a perfectly competitive economy, private decisions to enforce rights may result in either more or less enforcement than is socially efficient. Cases of multiple stable equilibria occur and an equilibrium may be locally, but not globally, efficient. Resources may not be employed in their socially most valuable uses and enforcement may be accompanied by inefficient investment in resource productivity. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 100 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 561-80
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:100:y:1992:i:3:p:561-80

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  1. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2009. "Property Rights and EconomicDevelopment," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 006, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  2. Antonia Díaz, 1997. "- Land Reform And Individual Property Rights," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  3. Shogren, Jason & Margolis, Michael, 2002. "Unprotected Resources and Voracious World Markets," Discussion Papers dp-02-30, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jonathan Conning & James A. Robinson, 2005. "Property Rights and the Political Organization of Agriculture," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 405, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Matthew J. Baker, 2005. "Technological Progress, Population Growth, Property Rights, and the Transition to Agriculture," Departmental Working Papers 9, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 2001. "A Ricardian Model of the tragedy of the Commons," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 20-01, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Dorward, Andrew & Kydd, Jonathan, 2003. "Policy Reform in Sub Saharan Africa," Policy Reform and Adjustment Workshop, October 23-25, 2003, Imperial College London, Wye Campus 15749, International Agricultural Policy Reform and Adjustment Project (IAPRAP). [Downloadable!]
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  9. Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Optimal Justice in a General Equilibrium Model with Non Observable Individual Productivities," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-37, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  10. Deininger, Klaus & Binswanger, Hans, 1999. "The Evolution of the World Bank's Land Policy: Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 247-76, August. [Downloadable!]
  11. Larry Karp, 2003. "Property rights, mobile capital, and comparative advantage," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 942, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Runge, C. Ford, 2004. "Sustainability And Enclosure: Land, Intellectual Property And Biotechnology," Working Papers 14464, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy. [Downloadable!]
  13. Bandiera, Oriana, 2002. "Private States and the Enforcement of Property Rights - Theory and Evidence on the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," CEPR Discussion Papers 3123, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Dorward, Andrew & Kydd, Jonathan & Poulton, Colin, 2004. "Market and Coordination Failures in Poor Rural Economies: Policy Implications for Agricultural and Rural Development," 2004 Inaugural Symposium, December 6-8, 2004, Nairobi, Kenya 9535, African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE). [Downloadable!]
  15. Hoff Karla & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2003. "Le processus de transition dans les économies post-communistes : vers une économie politique des droits de propriété," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 17(2), pages 91-109. [Downloadable!]
  16. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, daniel, 2000. ""Seize the state, seize the day": state capture, corruption, and influence in transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2444, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  17. Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "Property Rights and Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Grossman, Herschel I., 2005. "Inventors and pirates: creative activity and intellectual property rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 269-285, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Copeland, Brian R., 2005. "Policy Endogeneity and the Effects of Trade on the Environment," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 34(1), April. [Downloadable!]
  20. Matthew Baker, 2008. "A structural model of the transition to agriculture," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 257-292, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Massuanganhe, Israel Jacob, 2008. "Policies, Natural Resource Governance and Local Development," Ph.D Degree Theses 53061, University of the Free State, Department of Agricultural Economics. [Downloadable!]
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